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Resumo
Este trabalho investiga os mecanismos macroeconômicos de transmissªo de
choques nas quatro maiores economias da AmØrica Latina (Argentina, Brasil
Chile e MØxico), nos anos 90. Procura-se mostrar que a heterogeneidade dos
regimes de taxa de câmbio entre aquelas economias nªo tem implicado diferenças
em termos de autonomia da política monetÆria. Após um painel geral sobre o
problema de escolhas de regimes cambiais, argumenta-se que essas economias
devem buscar conjuntamente a formaçªo de colchıes de liquidez para lutar
contra eventuais choques que afetam a regiªo. Primeiramente, o paper destaca
a heterogeneidade de regimes de taxa de câmbio entre as economias latino-
-americanas como um resultado de políticas de estabilizaçªo e de crises de
liquidez ocorridas nos anos 90. Recuperam-se, entªo, alguns argumentos sobre
as vantagens e as desvantagens dos distintos regimes de câmbio que tŒm sido
suscitados no debate sobre a nova arquitetura financeira internacional. Em seguida,
apresentam-se algumas evidŒncias empíricas sobre transmissıes macroeco-
nômicas de perturbaçıes na regiªo, apontando que, embora diferentes regimes
de câmbio impliquem diferentes respostas macroeconômicas, nenhuma
economia tem se mostrado insular perante os choques que afetam a regiªo. Os
resultados deste artigo levam a sugerir que as economias da AmØrica Latina
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devem procurar construir algum tipo de defesa de liquidez em nível nacional,
dado que, mesmo com esforços nacionais de diferenciaçªo, ainda assim, o
destino financeiro comum dessas economias se mostra relevante.
Palavras-chave
InterdependŒncia macroeconômica; regimes cambiais; economias latino-
-americanas.
Abstract
This paper approaches the macroeconomic mechanisms of shock transmission
among Latin American largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico)
in the 90s.  We attempt to show that the heterogeneity of exchange rate regimes
among those economies has not implied their national autonomy insofar as
monetary policy. As a policy conclusion, we argue that those economies should
jointly search for national foreign-liquidity cushions against region-level shocks.
Firstly, the paper outlines the heterogeneity of exchange-rate regimes among
Latin American economies, as an outcome of stabilization policies and foreign-
-exchange crises in the 90s. We then recall some of the arguments regarding the
adequacy of exchange-rate regimes that have been raised in the debate on the
international financial architecture. Afterwards, we present some econometric
evidence on macroeconomic transmission of disturbances in Latin America,
pointing out that even though different exchange rate regimes have implied different
national macroeconomic responses, no one single economy has been able to
escape from regionally significant shocks. Our results lead us to suggest that
Latin American large economies should jointly attempt to build some regional
liquidity defense at each national level, given that their financial common fate
does not seem to be vanishing, despite efforts of national differentiation.
Key words
Macroeconomic interdependence; exchange rate regimes; Latin American
economies.
Classificaçªo JEL:  F41, F42, C22, C5
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Introduction
This paper approaches the macroeconomic mechanisms of shock
transmission among Latin American largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico) in the 90s.  We attempt to show that the heterogeneity of exchange
rate regimes among those economies has not implied their national autonomy
insofar as monetary policy. As a policy conclusion, we argue that those economies
should jointly search for national foreign-liquidity cushions against region-level
shocks.
Firstly, the paper outlines the heterogeneity of exchange-rate regimes among
Latin American economies, which resulted from stabilization policies and foreign-
exchange crises in the 90s. After successful stabilization programs based on
exchange-rate pegging and on capital inflows, each one of the large Latin American
economies underwent shocks associated to capital flows reversal. Whereas
Mexico, Chile and Brazil moved towards more flexible exchange-rate regimes,
Argentina stuck to her hard peg (currency board), making Latin America a blueprint
case for the hypothesis of bipolarization of exchange-rate regimes as an inevitable
trend among emerging economies (Eichengreen, 1999; Fischer, 2001).
We then review some of the arguments regarding the adequacy of those
bipolar types of exchange-rate regimes  hard pegs and floating  which have
appeared in the debate on the international financial architecture. We must
recall that there is no single currency regime right for all countries or at all times
(Frankel, 1999). In fact, any generalization based on recent experience is liable
to be dismissed by future developments.
Section 2 presents some econometric evidence on macroeconomic
transmission of disturbances in Latin America, pointing out that even though
different exchange rate regimes have implied different national macroeconomic
responses to shocks, not a single Latin American economy has been able to
escape from regionally significant shocks. Whether or not the region moves
towards flexible or bipolar regimes, macroeconomic interdependence is likely to
remain worth considering.
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On our argument, we resorted to some time series econometric exercises
regarding error correction models, causality tests and impulse-response analyses
from dynamic simulations and forecast analyses. The estimated econometric
models presented in Section 2 attempt to answer the following. In relation to
exchange rate regimes in those countries, we try to investigate whether nominal
and real exchange rates follow some long-term trajectory; whether there is evidence
of Granger causality among these variables; and how intensively nominal and
real exchange rate shocks of those economies affect the other exchange rates
in the region. We develop a similar exercise regarding exchange rates and trade.
Finally, we investigate how each of the Latin American large economies reacts
to monetary shocks originated from neighbor countries, focusing mainly on whether
external shocks on foreign exchange reserves have preceded changes in exchange
rates as well as whether they were transmitted to interest rates, and to what
degree. We expect to have been able to illustrate how the absence of a high
nominal exchange-rate interdependence, due to the heterogeneity of regimes,
may hide a very strong macroeconomic interdependence through other vehicles.
This result comes out forcefully whenenever we gather both foreign exchange
reserves and local interest rates as indicators of stress, in lieu of solely the
former.
We conclude the paper by highlighting some means by which Latin American
large economies could join efforts towards building a regional liquidity blindage.
Besides regional monetary cooperation, as well as individual negotiation of stand-
-by credit lines with foreign private sources, Latin American large countries might
consider a joint movement towards gaining access to the so far unused
Contingency Credit Line from IMF.
1 - Latin American exchange rate regimes
     and the bipolar view
There have been a wide variety of experiences with exchange rate regimes
throughout Latin America since the 80s. The spectrum goes from adoption of
hard pegs (currency board, dollarization), to experiences with fixed, but
adjustable, exchange rates or sliding bands, with these soft pegs ending up
being superseded by regimes with more flexible nominal adjustments of the
exchange rate.
The most common sequence begun with the adoption, at some moment, of
either exchange rate soft pegs (fixed-but-adjustable rates, crawling bands) or
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hard pegs as a basis for inflation stabilization programs. Given residual rates of
inflation  mostly from prices of non-traded goods and services  usually some
overvaluation of local currencies took place. Loss of trade competitiveness and
domestic growth bubbles (derived from consumption booms) often led to current-
-account deficits in the balance of payments, easily sustained by abundant ca-
pital flows to emerging markets in the first half of the 90s. Simultaneously, an
excessive dollarization of liabilities tended to occur (both as unit-of-account
and as means of payment), as well as a corresponding currency (and often
maturity) mismatch in portfolios, given declining perceived exchange-rate risks.
After a sudden stop and reversal of capital flows, triggering a twin (private
or public sector) financial and balance-of-payments crisis, soft pegs were
replaced by exchange rate fluctuation, usually going through some intermediary
period of overshooting of the local currency devaluation. Chile had the smoothest
recent experience of change, with a band being replaced by a floating regime. In
turn, Argentinas currency board was maintained during Mexico·s and Brazil·s
exchange-rate regime upheavals.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate how pegged exchange-rate regimes became
widespread in Latin America  until recently, as well as how only hardly pegged
regimes have survived since then (Brazil·s change came after, as well as
Equators full dollarization). Intermediate ranges of Table 2 lost weight when
compared to top and down ones.
This is the reason why Latin America became a major reference for the so-
-called bipolar view of surviving exchange rate regimes in emerging countries,
according to which only extreme regimes are intertemporally sustainable when
the emerging country is fully open to capital mobility (Eichengreen, 1999; Fischer,
2001). Indeed, each of the major twin crises in emerging economies involved
some local sort of exchange-rate peg at corresponding core countries: Mexico
(1994), Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea (1997), Russia and Brazil (1998),
Argentina and Turkey (2000).  On the other hand, economies with higher exchange-
-rate flexibility were able to undergo those turbulent moments without a major
macroeconomic disruption: Taiwan (1997), South Africa, Israel, Turkey and Mexico
(1998). Only hard pegs  Hong Kong and Argentina  survived.
Full capital mobility implies that markets avail themselves of arbitrage or
speculative opportunities whenever there is some misalignment between active
monetary and exchange-rate policies. Therefore, one of these has to be abdicated,
i.e. one policy has to follow the other.
The bipolar view stems from the classic impossible trinity, represented by
the triangle in Figure 1 below. Only corner solutions are feasible, combining at
most two objectives (as already exemplified in classical Mundell-Fleming
approaches).
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Table 1 
Pegged exchange rate  regimes in Latin American countries — 1979-2002 
 
1979 1982 1985 1988 1990 1991 1995 1998 2002 
Bolívia Equador Guatemala Equador  Haiti Argentina Argentina Argentina  Panama 
Chile El Salvador Haiti El Salvador Panama Nicarágua Brazil Brazil  
Costa Rica Guatemala Nicarágua Guatemala Rep. Dom. Panama Panama Panama  
Rep. Dom. Haiti Honduras Haiti   Mexico   
Equador Honduras Paraguai Honduras   Chile   
El Salvador Mexico Peru Nicarágua      
Guatemala Nicarágua Venezuela Paraguai      
Haiti Panama Panama Panama      
Honduras Paraguai  Peru      
Nicarágua Rep. Dom.  Venezuela      
Panama Venezuela        
Paraguai         
Venezuela         
SOURCE: IMF. IFS. 
NOTE: Both softly and hardly US$-pegged regimes (inc. dollarization).  
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Table 2 
 
Exchange rate regimes in Latin America: experiences and main features 
 
Regimes Main Features Examples 
1 - Free or Managed 
     ("Dirty") Float 
In case of Central Bank 
interventions upon market 
exchange rates ("dirty float"), 
they occur without an explicit 
target and not systematically. 
Active intervention (sterilized 
and non sterilized) results in 
changes in  foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Mexico after the 1994-5 
crisis, Brazil and Chile 
1999 onwards. Argentina 
after 2001. 
2 - Crawling (or Moving) 
     Band 
A band system whose  central 
parity slides over time. 
Chile (very wide) bands 
from 1986 to mid-1998. 
Brazil: 1995-98.  
3 - Crawling peg  Nominal exchange rates are 
adjusted periodically in 
accordance with a series of 
indicators or another rule.   
The system became 
popular in the decades of 
60s and 70s in Chile, 
Colombia and Brazil. 
Longest duration in 
Colombia.    
4 - Fixed but adjusted  
     exchange  rate  
Fixed nominal exchange rate 
but the central bank is not 
committed to stick to the parity. 
Parity realignments 
(depreciations) become a 
powerful policy instrument. 
Very rigid exchange rate 
system. The monetary authority 
can only interfere when  has 
liquid capital inflows.   
It is the most popular 
regime of the century.  
Example: Mexico, 1983-     
-93.   
5 - Currency Board Generic name given to an 
extreme form of the currency 
board system, where the 
country abandons its monetary 
autonomy completely by 
adopting the currency of 
another country as a fixed 
nominal anchor, as well as a 
guarantee of full convertibility.  
Historically, a small 
number of countries have 
adopted such a system. 
Tranquil exits only 
occurred when local 
currencies were tending to 
be appreciated with 
respect to anchor 
currencies. Argentina has 
a quasi-currency board 
system.   
6 - Full Dollarization (or  
    Euro-ization) 
Unilateral adoption of a foreign 
currency 
Panama, Equator.  
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On the other hand, as Frankel (1999) reminds us, it is still possible to have
something like half monetary independence and half discretionary exchange-
-rate policy. As long as boundaries of coherence (alignment) among policy
instruments and targets continue to be respected, a mix of monetary and
exchange-rate policies can be (softly or loosely) pursued. Until 1999, Chile
combined her Inflation Targeting (IT) monetary regime with wide exchange-rate
bands.
It is true, though, that either one or the other policy tends to remain subsidiary.
An example comes from an IT framework in which direct and indirect instruments
of intervention in foreign exchange markets are used as a complement to interest
rate policy, in order to avoid pass through of exchange-rate hikes on inflation.
Even when there is some (implicit and temporary) exchange rate level target,
interventions aim at the inflation rate, not the other way around.
After accepting the theoretical and empirical evidence on the pressure posed
by increasing capital mobility towards predominance of either monetary or
exchange-rate policies, it naturally follows the question of whether one of them
is inevitably the most appropriate choice for all (Latin American) emerging
economies. Defendants of passive monetary policies by those countries argue
for hard pegs, whereas those who are skeptical about the capability of the real
Figure 1  
 The Impossible Trinity 
 
      
 
 
 
Capital Controls 
        Pure Float Hard Peg 
 
MONETARY 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
EXCHANGE RATE 
 POLICY 
 
FULL FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION 
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side of developing economies to appropriately adjust to shocks tend to
recommend (re)active monetary policies and passive (flexible) exchange rates.
Let us briefly recall some of the advantages and disadvantages attributed
to each of the polar exchange-rate regimes, in the context of Latin American
emerging countries (Mishkin; Savastano, 2000; Calvo, 2000).
Advantages of hard pegs:
it provides a strong nominal anchor to domestic prices, definitely locking
in stabilization gains and locking out any sparkle of  domestic cost-price
spirals;
it imposes discipline on domestic fiscal, monetary and financial policies,
avoiding discretion and dynamic time-inconsistency problems (as well as
bailing out of private agents and other sources of moral risk);
it provides simplicity and clarity (transparency); and
it eliminates (or reduces) currency risks of domestic financial transactions,
lowering funding costs for both private and public sectors, as well as
fostering financial deepening.
Disadvantages of hard pegs:
monetary policies will not be available against domestically originated
shocks (e.g., supply shocks). Most Latin American economies feature
lack of fiscal flexibility, as well as a low capacity to swiftly adjust to
shocks on the real side of the economy. In this setting, large and protracted
fluctuations of investments, output and employment may generate credit
risks so high as to more than compensate for reduced currency risks;
there will be no Lender of Last Resort, what circumscribes financial safety
nets to privately constituted deposit insurances and thin interbank markets.
Given low degrees of domestic financial development, hard-to-access
financial safety nets tend to curb the propensity to assume risks and,
therefore, financial leverage and investments; and
easy exit strategies are very difficult to find. Given that optimality
conditions may change over time (see below), an occasional need of regime
change will face strong hysteretic effects (liability dollarization and strong
fear of floating).
Advantages of floating exchange rates:
monetary policy becomes free to target inflation or other macroeconomic
goal. Thus, monetary policy can deal with investment and output
fluctuations, including certain external shocks. Simultaneously, exchange
rate flexibility helps to adjust nominal and relative prices;
exchange rates become a thermometer of the economys health, something
that may remain hidden within a hard peg; and
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  it decreases the likelihood of underestimation of effective exchange-rate
risks
Disadvantages of floating exchange rates:
exchange-rate instability may lead to high currency risks and financial
instability, whenever there is partial dollarization of (private and/or public
sector) liabilities (as unit of account or as an effective means of payment).
Vulnerability with respect to currency fluctuations adds to the other financial
fragility features of emerging economies. On the other hand, one must
not forget that protracted real adjustments under hard pegs may result in
other even more dangerous sources of risks;
 some degree of financial development is required in order to make
appropriate instruments available to manage currency risks. Otherwise,
foreign exchange markets will become too subject to herding behavior
and manipulation, i.e. it will be too volatile. In any case, one should expect
a higher degree of dirtiness in emerging economies· fluctuation, as
compared to advanced countries, given their dependence on foreign capital
flows and their more frequent liquidity droughts and sudden credit
squeezes;
  nominal price volatility of tradable goods may increase inflation volatility,
given the critical position assumed by imported inputs and products in
emerging countries· GDP. This pass-through is one of the main reasons
underlying the observed fear of floating in emerging countries (Calvo;
Reinhart, 2000);
  price volatility of imports and exports may also hurt trade;  and
active monetary policies require a strong national will to build policy
credibility, rigorous prudential supervision of finance, no fiscal dominance
on monetary policy, and adjustment flexibility in the production system,
whereas hard pegs directly impose a discipline towards these attributes.
On the other hand, one knows that those are pre-requisites for any monetary
system to be stable and efficient. An attempt to establish hard pegs can
also be frustrated at its beginning if the country fails to attend those
preconditions. The relevant difference may come down to the higher speed
at which monetary credibility tends to be attained in the hard peg case, if
successfully established.
This balance of advantages and disadvantages can be translated into Robert
Mundell·s criteria for an Optimum Currency Area (OCA), as adapted by textbook
discussions about the convenience of tying local currencies versus letting them
float. As the degree of economic integration with the rest of the world increases,
advantages of fixed exchange rates increase with it, whereas advantages of
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flexible exchange rates tend to fall. This happens because of: larger potential
gains in terms of lower transaction costs and currency risks; higher inflationary
credibility and heavier weight of nominal anchor via hard pegs; and lower losses
derived from the loss of monetary policy.
Lower losses derived from the loss of monetary policy can be approached
through by observing the degree of correlation among shocks in the economy
and in the rest of the world (or for that matter a regional currency whose pegging
to is under consideration). Symmetry between those shocks means that required
monetary initiatives can be let to abroad.  In turn, labor mobility alleviates
inconveniences associated to asymmetry of shocks, whereas an overall
redistributive fiscal system is also helpful to compensate for that asymmetry.
Figure 2 (adapted from Frankel, 1999) presents the extent of trade and the
degree of income-correlation between the regions as indicators for assessing
optimum degrees of exchange-rate pegging (or OCA). The OCA line divides the
space into two sets, to the right of which , under prevailing conditions, the
advantages of hard pegs predominate.
Income
Correlation
 
 
 
 
 
Extent of Trade 
HARD PEGS 
 DOMINATE 
FLEXIBLE 
RATES 
DOMINATE 
BB 
AA 
OCA 
Figure 2 
 
Hardly pegged and floating currency areas 
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Frankel (1999) draws attention to differing possible hypotheses about what
tends to occur through time with respect to income-correlation as cross-border
trade rises. Line AA describes a trajectory for a country whose income-correlation
with the rest of the world grows as its trade increases. Some authors, however,
sustain that increasing specialization, accompanying higher trade, might reduce
income-correlation as represented by line BB.
The only unambiguous conclusion is that there is no single regime right for
all countries or at all times. In this respect, the difficulties to exit from hard peg
strategies should be taken into account.
One can also notice that OCA criteria should not be approached exclusively
from a static base. Provided that the starting position is not too far from the
borderline, OCA favourability can be endogenously built through institutional
adaptation.
A more recently stressed criterion for choosing exchange rate regimes is
the existing degree of policy credibility, as outlined above. Lack of monetary
credibility makes hard pegs more attractive. One cannot forget, on the other
hand, that this credibility will only be sustained, once stabilization gains have
been settled, if the latter ends up followed by good performance also in other
macroeconomic criteria (such as growth, high employment, low default risks
etc.).
Insofar as current exchange-rate regimes in Latin American economies, at
this point we propose the following intuitive observations (to be empirically
supported in the following section):
(i) its (bipolar) heterogeneity stems from their different recent experiences
  with exchange-rate-based stabilization and crises. But there is nothing
  to allow any expectation that their present configuration will remain as
  such in the future, or converge either towards one or the other extreme
  of the continuum of regimes;
(ii) current levels of foreign trade among Southern neighbours are relatively
    large  and sectorally important  enough to support currency pegging
  among themselves. At the same time, those levels are perhaps
  sufficiently high as to undermine national currency pegs to outside
   regions; and
(iii) notably in the case of Latin American emerging countries, OCA trade-
     -based criteria adapted to Optimum Exchange-rate Regimes leave aside
     some relevant financial dimensions of macroeconomic interdependence.
  Contagion and other neighborhood financial effects may turn their
    interdependence into a more significant fact than it seems from a trade
    perspective. These are the points to be discussed next.
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2 - Shocks and macroeconomic
      interdependence in Latin America:
      an econometric approach
This section presents some econometric evidence on macroeconomic
transmission of shocks throughout the largest Latin American economies. We
intend to show that, despite national differences in responses to shocks  coming
from abroad or within the region , they all have shown some common
macroeconomic sensitivity to them. Heterogeneous exchange rate regimes have
implied different national macroeconomic responses, but neither flexible nor hardly
pegged exchange rates have implied isolation. Whether or not the region moves
towards flexible or bipolar regimes, macroeconomic interdependence is likely to
remain worth considering by their policy makers.
The estimated econometric models here presented deal with the following.
With respect to exchange rate regimes in those countries, we try to
investigate whether exchange rates follow some long-term trajectory and how
intensively exchange rate shocks of those economies affect the other exchange
rates in the region. As one can expect from our previous discussion, no significant
structural trend towards convergence of regimes or rates was found.
On the other hand, we investigate how each of Latin Americas large
economies reacts to monetary shocks originated from neighbors, focusing mainly
on whether external shocks on foreign exchange reserves have preceded changes
in exchange rates as well as whether the former were transmitted to interest
rates, and to what degree. We expect to have been able to illustrate how the
absence of a high exchange-rate interdependence, due to the heterogeneity of
regimes, may hide a very strong macroeconomic interdependence through other
vehicles. This result comes out forcefully when we gather both foreign exchange
reserves and local interest rates as indicators of stress, instead of including only
those reserves.
Our sample for exchange-rate interdependence goes from the first quarter
of 1990 to the first quarter of 2000. A first approach is made through a graphic
analysis of the series to be researched. We then present some estimates of VAR
models for exchange rates of those countries, searching for long run movements
in terms of dynamic effects, according to impulse-response analysis. A similar
procedure was followed to observe relations among foreign exchange reserves,
interest rates for each economy, aiming to discover their reactions to external
shocks.
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2.1 - Exchange rate interdependence
Table 3 shows the outcomes of the unit root tests for exchange rate in level
and in first difference for Brazil, Chile and Mexico. As known, a unit root test is
always necessary before the empirical studies. Under null hypothesis of unit root
against alternative hypothesis of stationarity, the test is basically a regression of
the series in study according to the equation:
where t is the linear deterministic trend. That equation is estimated in the beginning
with very large lags and, afterwards, it is not significant to go through eliminating
lags immediately. We use this procedure to obtain white noise error. The
significance of the trend and of the constant is evaluated in each lag reduction.
The critical values of the ADF test are not obtained from a usual distribution, but
they were derived by MacKinnon (1991) for any sample size. However, the ADF
test is a weak one when the sample includes extreme events of types such as
intense price depression, supply shocks, among others. To control this problem
Perron and Vogelsang (1992) introduced dummy variables in (1):
where                                                                                  represents    the
moment where the structural break is observed, T is the sample size and  TB is
the date on which the structural break occurred.
Unit root tests shown synthetically in table 3, indicated that1:
 nominal exchange rates of Mexico and Chile are first order integrated in
 level, and stationary in first difference;
 whereas nominal exchange rates in Brazil are second order integrated in
 level, with no significant trend and constant components.
Through Graphs 1 and 2 of time series in level and in difference, one can
observe that all of the exchange rates, except for the case of Chile, present
strong structural breaks in the 90s. This is due to changes in exchange rate
DUt(λ) = 1 to t > Tλ, e DUt(λ) = 0; λ = TB/T
1
 The nominal exchange rate of Argentina is stationary in level  as it should be expected,
given her rigid exchange rate regime  whereas deterministic trend and constant components
were shown not to be significant.
∆yt = µ + βt + αyt-1 + 
i
p
=
∑
1
δi∆yt-1 + εt                                          (1) 
 
∆yt = µ + βt + αyt-1 + γDUt(λ) + 
i
p
=
∑
1
δi∆yt-1 + εt                         (2) 
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regimes, such as the adoption of the currency board in Argentina in 1991, the
regime of more fixed exchange rates in Brazil in 1994, and the Mexican foreign
exchange crisis at the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995. The econometric tests
take into account those structural breaks through Phillip-Perron test procedures.
The occurrence of such structural breaks in different periods of time implies
that attempts of cointegration analysis for the exchange rates in these four
economies will have very strong limitations. In other words, it is not likely that
exchange rates of those economies have presented some equilibrium path among
them.
Graph 1 
 
Logarithm of the nominal exchange rate in Latin American economies — 1990:01-2001:01 
 
 
SOURCE: IMF. IFS, CD-Rom and Central Banks. 
NOTES: LTCAR = Natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate in Argentina;   
LTCBR = Natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate in Brazil;  LTCCH = Natural 
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate in Chile; and LTCMX = Natural logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate in Mexico. 
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Table 3 
 
Unit tests for exchange rate in level and in first difference  Argentina, Brazil, 
 Chile e Mexico – Sample — 1990-2001 
 
VARIABLES LAGS ADF RESULTS 
LTCAR 5 3,33(a) Stationary 
LTCBR 1 -2,35(a) Not Stationary 
LTCCH 1 -2,00(b) Not Stationary 
LTCMX 3 -2,36(b) Not Stationary 
DLTCBR 1 -3,06(b) Not Stationary 
DLTCCH 1 -6,04(a) Stationary 
DLTCMX 1 -4,29(b) Stationary 
DDTCBR 1 -7,50(b) Stationary 
Critical Values: (a) 5% = -2,953  e 1% = -3,642. (b) 5% = -3,531  e 1% = -4,216.  
Graph 2 
 
Latin American selected countries: variability of the nominal 
 exchange rate — 1990:01-2001:01 
 
SOURCE: IMF. IFS, CD-Rom and Central Banks.
NOTES: DLTCAR = First difference of the log nominal exchange rate in Argentina;
DLTCBR = First difference of the log nominal exchange rate in Brazil; DLTCCH = First
difference of the log nominal exchange rate in Chile; and DLTCMX = First difference of
the log nominal exchange rate in Mexico.
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How intensively exchange rate shocks of those economies affect the other
exchange rates along the region? Impulse-response functions were estimated to
answer this question. Impulse-response functions are useful to summarize
dynamic relations between the variables in a vector autoregressive. We used the
stationary form of the series to estimate VARs with five lags, reducing them up
to one lag. We are concerned about the error that must follow a white noise
specification, so we have chosen the system which best meets the Information
Criteria, as we can see in Table 4. It was necessary to introduce variables dummies
to obtain the gaussian errors in the estimated VARs, in all model specifications
in this paper, in every impulse-response analysis, either for exchange rate system,
or for foreign exchange reserve and interest rate soon ahead.
Impulse-response functions for exchange rate systems are shown in Graph
3. The first line of graphs indicates the response of Brazilian exchange rate to
impulse of the exchange rate from three other economies, Argentina, Chile and
Mexico, with two standard-error band. The second line shows the response of
Argentina·s exchange rate to two standard-error impulses originating from Brazil,
Chile and Mexicos exchange rates, and so on.
Notice a weak relation of the exchange rate changes of Argentina on
exchange rates of the other economies. It can be observed, however, that impulses
coming from Brazilian exchange rates affect the other economies in a substantial
way. It is true that all economies are affected, but the response of other exchange
rates to the impulses of Argentina·s exchange rate is not significant.  There is, in
fact, evidence that the shocks in terms of exchange rates in those four main
Latin American economies show, at first sight, important asymmetry in terms of
timing and intensity.
Table 4 
 
Model selection for VAR I(0) for impulse-response analysis of exchange rate 
SYSTEMS/METHODS LOG LIKELIHOOD AKAIKE INFORMATION 
CRITERIA 
SCHWARZ 
CRITERIA 
System 05 lags  177,29  182,54 186,39 
System 04 lags  153,37  157,49 160,57 
System 03 lags  130,58  133,64 135,98 
System 02 lags 79,97 59,40 43,40 
System 01 lags 33,63 32,52 31,64 
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Graph 3 
 
Impulse-response functions for exchange rates systems 
 
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Impulse-response functions for exchange rates systems 
 
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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2.2 - Exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves
         and interest rates
Now we analyze the empirical relations between exchange rates and foreign
exchange reserves. It is known that, under more rigid exchange rate regimes,
foreign exchange reserves should be either high or at least grow equally or more
than proportionally to the increase of eventual trade balance and current account
deficits. As Chiles exchange rate was, throughout the period, more flexible than
the ones of the other countries, one could expect that relation to be weaker in
this country. On the other hand, insofar as foreign exchange reserves as a leading
indicator of foreign exchange crises, it is often expected that, under conditions
of abrupt falls of the former, the latter undergoes strong alteration, and even that
the exchange rate regime will change to another.
Initially, it can be questioned whether movements of foreign exchange
reserves cointegrate among the researched economies. Many interpretations of
foreign exchange crises attribute a unique role to the behavior of foreign exchange
reserves2, usually stressing some contagion effects among the economies in
the region, through flows of liquid types of capital.  A preliminary graph analysis
seems to indicate that there is a strong upward movement along most of the
decade in foreign exchange reserves of the four countries. Notice, however, that
during external crises coming from abroad the area  such as the Asian and
Russian crises  Brazil was much more vulnerable than the other countries.
Finally, during the Brazilian foreign exchange crisis, it cannot be denied that
there were downward movements in the foreign exchange reserves curve in
Argentina, Mexico and Chile. Graph 4  foreign exchange reserves in the four
countries  clearly display three key moments in terms of neighborhood
contagion: firstly, in the beginning of the decade (1990-1991); secondly, around
the Mexican crisis (1994-1995); and finally starting from the middle of 1997 to
the end of 1999.
2
 See, for instance, Andrade, Divino and Silva (2000, p. 225), where the authors state that
exchange rate crises are identified as starting from the cyclical behavior of the foreign
exchange reserves. Later on we will argue that some of the abrupt movements in foreign
exchange reserves have been associated in a stronger fashion with significant alterations in
interest rates,  rather than in exchange rate parities. Furthermore, strong movements upward
in interest rates are not accompanied by proportional increases in foreign exchange
reserves.
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Foreign exchange reserves in level and in first difference — 1990:01-2001:01 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: IMF. IFS, CD-Rom and Central Banks. 
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We developed an empirical analysis for understanding the long run
movement in foreign exchange reserves in those main four Latin American
countries. The Cointegration analysis took place because we could obtain
information about long term equilibrium trajectory for estimated VAR (Vector Auto-
-Regressive). Since Sims (1980), the VAR models have become an alternative
to traditional estimation procedures. Sims considered, in a first stage, all variables
as endogenous, avoiding capture false or spurious restrictions in the model.
Starting from statistical procedures, the appropriate lag is determined, as well
as the appropriate treatment to be given to the trend of variables. The estimation
of the long term equilibrium relation is based on the following vector autoregressive:
where the matrix      has a reduced rank when there is cointegration, that is to
say, when linear combinations  of      
  
 are stationaries. So, the matrix        can be
decomposed in two matrix                and      such as                   The matrix β
represents the co-integration vectors and the matrix       represents the weight, or
the importance, of the cointegration relations in each equation. In other words,
the Johansen test estimates the equation above under the restriction that        has
reduced rank; the non-restrictive model assumes that      has a complete rank.
   is gaussian with covariance matrix     .
After tests for model reduction3, we found that the system with just one lag
could be adopted for effect of cointegration analysis, without loss of relevant
information. Maximum eignvalue and trace statistics indicate that the hypothesis
that there are at least two cointegration vectors for the estimated system cannot
be rejected (Table 5).
Table  6  shows  the       matrix (adjustment  matrix) and     matrix (co-
-integration vectors matrix). Each row of the matrix       shows one co-integration
vector. In this case the hypothesis of existence of one co-integration vector is
valid, being equivalent to the hypothesis of a significant stationary linear
combination among time series of the system. After normalized, the matrix       of
co-integration vectors can be interpreted as a long term parameter.
In the other part, each line of the      presents the group of weights with
which the co-integration vectors appear in the respective equation. The matrix
      measures the speed of adjustment of variables with respect to a disturbance
in the balance relation. Such a matrix is denominated adjustment matrix.
Π
Yt
p x r α β Π = α.β’.
Π
α
Π
Ω
3
 We always test the reduction in general model in terms of lags and chose the best model from
Information Criteria, as we have written before.
Π
εt
α
β
β
β
α
α
∆yt = µ + Πyt-1 + 
j
k
=
−∑
1
1
Γj∆yt-j + εt                                                   (4) 
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Table 5  
 
Test statistics for cointegration analysis of the foreign exchange reserves in Brazil,  
Argentina, Chile e Mexico  — 1990-2001 
 
Ho:rank = p MAX EIGNVALUE TEST 95% TRACE TEST 95% 
p = 0 41.09** 28.1 77.43** 53.1 
p ≤ 1 20.09 22.0 36.34** 34.9 
p ≤  2 12.42 15.7 16.25 20.0 
p ≤  3 3.825 9.2 3.825 9.2 
 
Table 6 
 
Cointegration analysis: standarded α and β’ matrices 
 
α (adjustment matrix) β’ (co-integration vectors matrix) 
VARIABLES 
LREAR LREBR LRECH LREMX LREAR LREBR LRECH LREMX 
LREAR -0.7263 -0.0084 -0.1487 -0.00199 1.000  -0.0472     -1.053  -0.5285  
LREBR -0.2259 -0.2471 0.3170 0.04911 -4.993  1.000  8.516  5.233 
LRECH -0.0022 -0.0158 -0.1195  -0.0013  0.0589  -0.495  1.000 -0.137 
LREMX -0.2822 -0.0076 0.8825 -0.0193 3.458 -3.181 -1.001 1.000 
 
Regarding the hypothesis that there is neighborhood contagion through
movements of foreign exchange reserves, in the case of the system for foreign
exchange reserves of the four Latin American economies, one can see that the
first line of    implies a long term relation in which the coefficient of foreign
exchange reserves in a country appears with the expected sign. Insofar as the
matrix     , it seems to indicate that the significant co-integration vector is present
in the foreign exchanges equation of other countries. In other words, one cannot
consider the variables of the marginal process as being weakly exogenous for
the parameters in foreign exchanges equation.
The analysis of weak exogeneity has an important implication in terms of
economic policies. In other words, it was observed that each economy is not
able to control its foreign exchange by itself, mainly under strong external shocks,
β
α
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independently of the exchange rate regime. Notice that while Argentina·s foreign
exchange reserves are weakly exogenous for Brazil·s foreign exchange reserves,
the opposite is not a valid conclusion; in this case, the Brazilian foreign exchange
is present in the foreign reserves equation of Argentina, Mexico and Chile. Whereas
Mexico·s foreign exchange reserves are present in foreign exchange reserve
equations of all the other countries, and Argentina·s foreign exchange is only
present in Chiles foreign exchange equation.
Therefore, one cannot deny the hypothesis of a strong interdependence in
terms of foreign exchange reserves among the four researched economies. On
the other hand, such interdependence assumes asymmetrical characteristics,
given that the hypothesis of some occasional neighborhood contagion effects
cannot be rejected, since it is assumed that there are many more effects blowing
from Brazil and from Mexico towards the other economies, more than the other
way around. One might conclude, therefore, that this asymmetrical
interdependence in terms of foreign exchange contagions cannot be taken as an
exclusive function of the choice of exchange rate regime in each country.
2.3 - Adjustment under external shocks: the
        roles of foreign exchange reserves
         and of interest rates
As Latin American economies converged at some point over the 90s towards
more rigid exchange rate adjustment mechanisms, with the exception of Chile,
one could expect that foreign exchange reserves would assume a central role in
their exchange rate management. Furthermore, one could also expect that, in
situations of external disturbances, monetary authorities would use interest rates
more intensively than exchange rates as a variable of accommodation to external
shocks. Since not all of the economies were under the same exchange rate
regime, particularly at the time of those adverse circumstances, it becomes
interesting to examine whether the use of interest rates was substantially different
under those divergent exchange rate regimes.
A preliminary graphic analysis points to the fact that all of the researched
countries used interest rates as an instrument for taming capital flows,
independently of the degree of flexibility in nominal exchange-rate adjustments.
However, only Brazil and Chile made intensive use of this variable. At first sight,
when focusing solely upon the interest rate  in per cent terms , one is tempted
to conclude that neither Argentina nor Mexico substantially used interest rates
after the Mexican crisis, even under the Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises.
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However, when the normalized interest rates are observed, it seems that all
four countries made intense use of interest rates in circumstances of disturbances
arising from monetary and financial markets. This becomes clear in Graph 6,
especially in the third and fourth graphic illustration (6.c and 6.d). Thence we are
allowed to conclude that not only did Brazil make substantial alterations in its
basic interest rate but also that neither Brazil nor Chile made more regular use of
this instrument, as all Latin American economies in several moments traded off
some economic growth for sustaining exchange rate parities by raising interest
rates.
We find it reasonable to understand these results as a denial of the
hypothesis that an exchange rate crisis can be easily identified as starting from
sudden movements in the levels and in the variance of foreign exchange reserves.
Before estimating the econometric model, tests were made for foreign
exchange reserves, as well as for interest rates. The series were transformed
into logarithms and, due to the fact that there is no stationarity in levels, they
were, afterwards, transformed for the logarithm of first difference. The results of
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test are shown in Table 7.
As for the impulse-response analysis, Graph 7 indicates: the initial impulse
in standard-error foreign exchange reserves (first graph of the first line of figure);
the effect on the interest rate of an impulse in foreign exchange reserves (second
graph of the first line of figure); the response in foreign exchange reserve to a
standard-error impulse in interest rates (first graph of the second line of figure);
and the response of the interest rate to the standard error impulse in foreign
exchange reserves for the four economies.
Except for Chile, in all of the economies foreign exchange reserves resist
very weakly to impulses coming from interest rates, whereas interest rates show
very strong resistance to impulses coming from foreign exchange reserves. The
response of the interest rate in Brazil and in Argentina to impulses from foreign
exchange reserves may be indisputably considered as the sharpest and covering
a time interval that extends over more than three quarters. In the case of Chile
and Mexico, this response is much smaller and extends over less than two
quarters. Mexico·s response in terms of interest rates to impulses from foreign
exchange reserves is already stronger than the one of Brazil, although it extends
beyond four quarters, with a clear definition of accommodation.
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Graph 5
 
Foreign exchange reserves and interest rates in the Brazil, Argentina, Chile e Mexico (normalized) — 1990:01-2001:01 
SOURCE: IMF. IFS, CD-Rom and Central Banks.  
NOTE: ReAR = Foreign exchange reserve in Argentina; ReBR = Foreign exchange reserve in Brazil; ReCH = 
= Foreign exchange reserve in Chile; ReMX = Foreign exchange reserve in Mexico; TJDAR = Interest rate in 
rgentina; TJDBR = Interest rate in Brazil; TJDCH = Interest rate in Chile; and TJDMX = Interest rate in 
Mexico. 
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Interest rates in level (per cent), in first difference and adjusted mean — 1990:01-2001:01 
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356
M
árcio H
olland; O
taviano C
anuto
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 25, n. 2, p. 329-364, out. 2004
Graph 6 
 
Interest rates in level (per cent), in first difference and adjusted mean — 1990:01-2001:01 
 
 
 
SOURCE: IMF. IFS, CD-Rom and Central Banks. 
 
NOTE: TJDAR = Interest rate in Argentina; TJDBR = Interest rate in Brazil; TJDCH = Interest rate in Chile; 
TJDMX = Interest rate in Mexico; DTJDAR = First difference in interest rate in Argentina; DTJDBR = First 
difference in interest rate in Brazil; DTJDCH = First difference in interest rate in Chile; and DTJDMX = First 
difference in interest rate in Mexico. 
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Table 7  
 
Unit root tests - ADF    Sample — 1990-2001 
 
VARIABLES ADF RESULTS 
LREAR -2,456 Not Stationary 
LREBR -1,006 Not Stationary 
LRECH -1,292 Not Stationary 
LREMX -2,24 Not Stationary 
DLREAR -9,044 Stationary 
DLREBR -6,081 
 
Stationary 
DLRECH -5,248 
 
Stationary 
DLREMX -5,083 
 
Stationary 
LTJAR -2,951 Not Stationary 
LTJBR -4,405 Not Stationary 
LTJCH -2,912 Not Stationary 
LTJMX -1,953 Not Stationary 
DLTXAR -7,205 
 
Stationary 
DLTJBR -10,8 
 
Stationary 
DLTJCH -7,906 
 
Stationary 
DLTJMX -5,47 
 
Stationary 
NOTE:  Critical Values: 5% = -3,535 e 1% = -4,224. 
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Graph 7 
 
Impulse-response functions for foreign exchange reserves and interest rates 
 
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.                               Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           (continue) 
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Impulse-response functions for foreign exchange reserves and interest rates 
 
       Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.                            Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Table 8 
 
Model selection for VAR I(0) for impulse-response analysis of interest rate 
 and  foreign exchange reserves shocks 
 
COUNTRIES SYSTEMS/METHODS 
LOG 
LIKELIHOOD 
AKAIKE 
INFORMATION 
CRITERIA 
SCHWARZ 
CRITERIA 
Argentina System 05 lags  5,98  7,32 8,31 
 System 04 lags  4,81  5,87 6,68 
 System 03 lags  1,24  2,04 2,66 
 System 02 lags -4,69 -4,13 -3,69 
 System 01 lags -9,34 -9,01 -8,75 
     
Brazil System 05 lags -17,62 -16,29 -15,29 
 System 04 lags -18,92 -17,86 -17,05 
 System 03 lags -20,42 -19,62 -19,00 
 System 02 lags -25,05 -24,49 -24,05 
 System 01 lags -25,87 -25,55 -25,29 
     
Chile System 05 lags  29,34  30,67 31,67 
 System 04 lags  27,96  29,02 29,83 
 System 03 lags  24,94  25,74 26,36 
 System 02 lags  19,50  20,05 20,49 
 System 01 lags  19,11  19,43 19,69 
     
Mexico System 05 lags  27,41  28,74 29,74 
 System 04 lags  22,83  23,89 24,70 
 System 03 lags  21,46  22,26 22,88 
 System 02 lags  13,89 14,45 14,89 
 System 01 lags 11,57  11,90 12,16 
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3 - Final remarks
Despite the fact that our empirical findings cover only the ´90s in four
countries, our results suggest the following conclusions. Firstly, there is no
indication of exchange rate interdependence among the economies analyzed, in
the sense that the choice of an exchange rate regime in an economy has directly
affected choices made by the other economies. Each experience with the adoption
of a more rigidly pegged exchange rate regimes corresponded exclusively to
specific domestic circumstances. This runs against the idea that historical
evidence has recently pointed towards any homogeneity, even though a recent
bipolarization movement in the region was evident. The possibility of future
reconfigurations It remains open.
The second conclusion concerns the expected strong negative relation
between degrees of flexibility in the exchange rate regime and needs of foreign
exchange reserves. In this case, economies such as Argentina’s would be required
to operate with reserves much larger than Chile’s. The most interesting case
detected by our empirical exercises was that these economies presented signs
of neighborhood contagion effects with respect to movements of their foreign
exchange reserves, with common moments of intense oscillations in the later.
One can come to the conclusion that, given strong contagion effects, the
divergence among exchange rate regimes was not sufficient to imply significant
differences with respect to autonomy of macroeconomic policies. Independently
of their heterogeneous regimes, all four economies jointly presented to be
vulnerable regarding abrupt changes in capital flows towards the region.
Fourth, we raised doubts about some established hypotheses regarding
the use of macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms along the divergent exchange
rate regimes in the region. According to our empirical results, except for Chile,
foreign exchange reserves resist very weakly to the impulses coming from
interest rates, whereas interest rates resist very strongly to the impulses from
foreign exchange reserves. This implies that macroeconomic adjustment policies
had to resort to very high interest rates as an instrument to control foreign
exchange, in situations of impulses, given that increases in interest rates often
presented weak response in terms of foreign exchange reserves. This also
suggests that one should go beyond simple matching of sudden behavior changes
of foreign exchange reserves with situations of exchange rate crises.
The interest rate responses in Brazil to impulses of foreign exchange
reserves can be considered as the most accentuated and for a time interval that
extends over more than three quarters. In the case of Chile, its response is
weaker and extends over less than two quarters. Mexico´s response in terms of
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interest rates to impulses from foreign exchange reserves is already stronger
than that of Brazil, yet it extends beyond four quarters, with a clear definition of
accommodation. One can conclude that the intensity of use of interest rates as
a control instrument over foreign exchange reserves is independent from the
degree of rigidity of exchange rate regimes in the economies, thus, one must
look somewhere else in order to explain such a divergence in monetary policies.
As a last educated guess, insofar as policy, we suggest that Southern
Latin American large economies should jointly attempt to build some regional
“liquidity defense”, given that their financial common fate does not seem to be
vanishing, despite efforts of national differentiation. Besides searching for
macroeconomic convergence and for private sources of stand-by credit lines,
maybe the time is right for a joint negotiation to enter the Contingency Credit
Line from IMF. Given current stages of macroeconomic policies and
interdependence, joint movements towards national liquidity cushions might help
substantially to reduce disruptive propagation of shocks along the region.
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